Date: Mon 18 Jul 1988 00:16-EDT From: AIList Moderator Nick Papadakis Reply-To: AIList@mc.lcs.mit.edu Us-Mail: MIT Mail Stop 38-390, Cambridge MA 02139 Phone: (617) 253-2737 Subject: AIList Digest V8 #11 To: AIList@mc.lcs.mit.edu Status: R AIList Digest Monday, 18 Jul 1988 Volume 8 : Issue 11 Today's Topics: Free Will K. Godel. Carlos Castaneda How to dispose of the free will issue ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 12 Jul 88 17:53:05 +0100 From: "Gordon Joly, Statistics, UCL" Subject: K. Godel. >From AIList Digest V8 #6 [ Date: 6 Jul 88 17:04:13 GMT [ >From: mcvax!ukc!etive!aiva!jeff@uunet.uu.net (Jeff Dalton) [ Subject: Re: Free Will-Randomness and Question-Structure [ [ In article <304@proxftl.UUCP> bill@proxftl.UUCP (T. William Wells) writes: [ ] Actually, the point was just that: when I say that something is [ ] true in a mathematical sense, I mean just one thing: the thing [ ] follows from the chosen axioms; [ [ "True" is not the same as "follows from the axioms". See Godel et al. Mathematical axioms spawn proofs (not truths). Godel's theorem says you may find a proposition you cannot prove with your "chosen axioms". Way out. Make the statement you cannot prove an axiom, taking care not to get an unbounded number of axioms. I look forward to axiomatic engineering and axiomatic political science. Gordon Joly. Surface mail: Dr. G.C.Joly, Department of Statistical Sciences, University College London, Gower Street, LONDON WC1E 6BT, U.K. E-mail: | Tel: +44 1 387 7050 JANET (U.K. national network) gcj@uk.ac.ucl.stats | extension 3636 (Arpa/Internet form: gcj@stats.ucl.ac.uk) | Relays: ARPA,EAN: @nss.cs.ucl.ac.uk | CSNET: %nss.cs.ucl.ac.uk@relay.cs.net | BITNET: %ukacrl.bitnet@cunyvm.cuny.edu, @ac.uk EARN: @ukacrl.bitnet, @AC.UK By uucp/Usenet: ....!uunet!mcvax!ukc!stats.ucl.ac.uk!gcj ------------------------------ Date: 12 Jul 88 19:08:25 GMT From: hartung@nprdc.arpa (Jeff Hartung) Reply-to: hartung@nprdc.arpa (Jeff Hartung) Subject: Re: Carlos Castaneda In a previous article, James J. Lippard writes: > I would like to advise caution in reading these works, and recommend a few >books which are highly skeptical of Castaneda. These works present evidence >that Castaneda's "Don Juan" writings are neither autobiographical nor valid >ethnography. E.N. Anderson, then associate professor of anthropology at UCLA >(where Castaneda received his doctorate), wrote (in The Zetetic, Fall/Winter >1977, p. 122) that "de Mille exposed many inconsistencies that prove *either* >that Castaneda was a brilliant fraud *or* that he was an incredibly careless >and sloppy ethnographer in a disorganized department." (He believes the >latter.) >... I noticed that the most recent Casteneda book in the series, "The Fire From Within," was published as a work of fiction, unlike the previous six books. I took this to be a confession that the works were largely fictitous even prior to it. Furthermore, the later books state that what Casteneda believed to be a Yaqui philosophy initially was in fact a view belonging to a small cult of "sorcerers" and not to the Yaqui in general, even if you *do* believe the assertion that the first six books make of being non-fiction. --Jeff Hartung-- ARPA - hartung@nprdc.arpa hartung@sdics.ucsd.edu UUCP - !ucsd!nprdc!hartung !ucsd!sdics!hartung ------------------------------ Date: 13 Jul 88 18:03:32 GMT From: ns!logajan@umn-cs.arpa (John Logajan x3118) Subject: Re: How to dispose of the free will issue (long) Since we are asked to believe in unprovable things, such as the no-free-will theory (or the free-will theory for that matter) why not believe in every unproveable theory. Just try combining the deterministic theory with the many worlds theory. In many worlds, at each instant the universe splits into an infinite number of alternate universes, each one taking a slightly different 'turn'. i.e. in one universe I get killed, in another I don't etc. Each sub-universe futher splits into an infinite number and so on. You can argue determinism both ways here. After all every possibility is addressed, and so it is deterministic in some sense and yet it isn't. My point is that unproveable theories aren't very useful. - John M. Logajan @ Network Systems; 7600 Boone Ave; Brooklyn Park, MN 55428 - - {...rutgers!umn-cs, ...amdahl!bungia, ...uunet!rosevax!bungia} !ns!logajan - ------------------------------ Date: 15 Jul 88 12:47:23 GMT From: bwk@mitre-bedford.arpa (Barry W. Kort) Subject: Re: How to process of the free will question. Suppose we build an intelligent system who is able to access information from the outside world and thereby acquire knowledge and abilities. We ask it, "Do you have Free Will?" Suppose it answers, "Gee, I'm not sure. Can you suggest an experiment I can do on myself to find out?" What do we reply? --Barry Kort ------------------------------ End of AIList Digest ********************