Date: Tue 12 Jul 1988 00:50-EDT
From: AIList Moderator Nick Papadakis <AIList-REQUEST@mc.lcs.mit.edu>
Reply-To: AIList@mc.lcs.mit.edu
Us-Mail: MIT Mail Stop 38-390, Cambridge MA 02139
Phone: (617) 253-2737
Subject: AIList Digest   V8 #6
To: AIList@mc.lcs.mit.edu
Status: RO


AIList Digest            Tuesday, 12 Jul 1988       Volume 8 : Issue 6

Today's Topics:

  Free Will

---------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Wed, 22 Jun 88 18:37 MST
From: "James J. Lippard" <Lippard@BCO-MULTICS.ARPA>
Reply-to: Lippard@BCO-MULTICS.ARPA
Subject: Carlos Castaneda

In a couple of recent issues of AI-List (vol. 7 nos. 28 and 42), Andy
Ylikoski has recommended the works of Carlos Castaneda, stating that they
"approach the concept of will from Yaqui Indian knowledge point of view" and
that "The Yaqui have their own scientific tradition anthropologically studied
by Castaneda."
   I would like to advise caution in reading these works, and recommend a few
books which are highly skeptical of Castaneda.  These works present evidence
that Castaneda's "Don Juan" writings are neither autobiographical nor valid
ethnography.  E.N.  Anderson, then associate professor of anthropology at UCLA
(where Castaneda received his doctorate), wrote (in The Zetetic, Fall/Winter
1977, p. 122) that "de Mille exposed many inconsistencies that prove *either*
that Castaneda was a brilliant fraud *or* that he was an incredibly careless
and sloppy ethnographer in a disorganized department." (He believes the
latter.)

   de Mille, Richard.  _Castaneda's Journey: The Power and the Allegory_,
     Capra Press, 1976.
   ---, editor.  _The Don Juan Papers: Further Castaneda Controversies_,
     Ross Erikson, 1980.
   Noel, Daniel, editor.  _Seeing Castaneda: Reactions to the "Don Juan"
     Writings of Carlos Castaneda_, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1976.

The Noel book contains some conjectures regarding Castaneda's works being
bogus, but the de Mille books give the hard evidence (e.g., internal
inconsistencies and contradictions, comparisons with other studies of Yaqui
culture, interviews with people familiar with the author and subject matter,
examination of Castaneda's background and influences, etc.)


  Jim Lippard
  Lippard at BCO-MULTICS.ARPA

------------------------------

Date: 3 Jul 88 04:38:11 GMT
From: mailrus!uflorida!novavax!proxftl!bill@ohio-state.arpa  (T.
      William Wells)
Subject: Re: Free Will & Self-Awareness

In article <2485@uvacs.CS.VIRGINIA.EDU>, Carl F. Huber writes:
) In article <306@proxftl.UUCP> T. William Wells writes:
) >Let's consider a relatively uncontroversial example.  Say I have
) >a hot stove and a pan over it.  At the entity level, the stove
) >heats the pan.  At the process level, the molecules in the stove
) >transfer energy to the molecules in the pan.
) > ...
) >Now, I can actually try to answer your question.  At the entity
) >level, the question "how do I cause it" does not really have an
) >answer; like the hot stove, it just does it.  However, at the
) >process level, one can look at the mechanisms of consciousness;
) >these constitute the answer to "how".
)
) I do not yet see your distinction in this example.
) What is the difference between saying the stove _heats_ or the
) molecules _transfer_energy_?  The distinction must be made in the
) way we describe what's happening.  In each case above, you seem to
) be giving the pan and the molecules volition.

[Minor nitpick: the pan and the molecules act, but volition and
action are not the same things. The discussion of the difference
belongs in a philosophy newsgroup, however.]

)                                                The stove does not
) heat the pan.  The stove is hot.  The pan later becomes hot.  Molecules do
) not transfer energy.  The molecules in the stove have energy s+e.  Then
) the molecules in the pan have energy p+e and the molecules in the
) stove have energy s.
)
) So it seems that both cases here are entity level, since the answer
) to "how do I cause it" is the same.  If I have totally missed the
) point, could you please try again?
)
) -carl

I think you missed the point. Perhaps I can fill in some missed
information. I think you got the idea that the process level
description could be made without reference to entities; this is
not the case. The process level MUST be made with reference to
entities, the main point is that these acting entities are not
the same as the entity involved in the entity level description.

Does that help? Also, could we move this discussion to another
newsgroup?

------------------------------

Date: 6 Jul 88 15:36:15 GMT
From: mcvax!ukc!etive!aiva!jeff@uunet.uu.net  (Jeff Dalton)
Subject: Re: How to dispose of the free will issue (long)

In article <794@l.cc.purdue.edu> cik@l.cc.purdue.edu (Herman Rubin) writes:
>Whether or not we have free will, we should behave as if we do,
>because if we don't, it doesn't matter.

If that is true -- if it doesn't matter -- then we will do just as well
to behave as if we do not have free will.

,

------------------------------

Date: 6 Jul 88 17:04:13 GMT
From: mcvax!ukc!etive!aiva!jeff@uunet.uu.net  (Jeff Dalton)
Subject: Re: Free Will-Randomness and Question-Structure

In article <304@proxftl.UUCP> bill@proxftl.UUCP (T. William Wells) writes:
] Actually, the point was just that: when I say that something is
] true in a mathematical sense, I mean just one thing: the thing
] follows from the chosen axioms;

"True" is not the same as "follows from the axioms".  See Godel et al.

------------------------------

Date: 8 Jul 88 16:18:37 GMT
From: cs.utexas.edu!sdcrdcf!markb@ohio-state.arpa  (Mark Biggar)
Subject: Re: How to dispose of the free will issue (long)

In article <488@aiva.ed.ac.uk> Jeff Dalton writes:
>In article <794@l.cc.purdue.edu> Herman Rubin writes:
>>Whether or not we have free will, we should behave as if we do,
>>because if we don't, it doesn't matter.
>If that is true -- if it doesn't matter -- then we will do just as well
>to behave as if we do not have free will.

Not so, believing in free will is a no lose situation; while
believing that you don't have free is a no win situation.
In the first case either your right or it doesn't matter, in the second
case either your wrong or it doesn't matter.  Game theory (assuming
you put more value on being right then wrong (if it doesn't matter
there are no values anyway)) says the believing and acting like you
have free will is the way that has the most expected return.

Mark Biggar
{allegra,burdvax,cbosgd,hplabs,ihnp4,akgua,sdcsvax}!sdcrdcf!markb
markb@rdcf.sm.unisys.com

------------------------------

Date: 8 Jul 88 19:53:21 GMT
From: bc@media-lab.media.mit.edu  (bill coderre)
Subject: Re: How to dispose of the free will issue (long)

In article <5384@sdcrdcf.UUCP> markb@sdcrdcf.UUCP (Mark Biggar) writes:
>In article <488@aiva.ed.ac.uk> jeff@uk.ac.ed.aiva Jeff Dalton writes:
>>In article <794@l.cc.purdue.edu> cik@l.cc.purdue.edu (Herman Rubin) writes:
>>>Whether or not we have free will, we should behave as if we do,
>>>because if we don't, it doesn't matter.
>>If that is true -- if it doesn't matter -- then we will do just as well
>>to behave as if we do not have free will.
>Not so, believing in free will is a no lose situation; while
>believing that you don't have free is a no win situation.




Whereas arguing about free will is a no-win situation.

Arguing about free will is also certainly not AI.

Thank you for your consideration.



mr bc

------------------------------

Date: 10 Jul 88 22:04:43 GMT
From: ukma!uflorida!novavax!proxftl!bill@husc6.harvard.edu  (T.
      William Wells)
Subject: Re: How to dispose of the free will issue (long)

In article <5384@sdcrdcf.UUCP>, markb@sdcrdcf.UUCP (Mark Biggar) writes:
> In article <488@aiva.ed.ac.uk> jeff@uk.ac.ed.aiva Jeff Dalton writes:
> >In article <794@l.cc.purdue.edu> cik@l.cc.purdue.edu (Herman Rubin) writes:
> >>Whether or not we have free will, we should behave as if we do,
> >>because if we don't, it doesn't matter.
> >If that is true -- if it doesn't matter -- then we will do just as well
> >to behave as if we do not have free will.
>
> Not so, believing in free will is a no lose situation; while
> believing that you don't have free is a no win situation.
> In the first case either your right or it doesn't matter, in the second
> case either your wrong or it doesn't matter.  Game theory (assuming
> you put more value on being right then wrong (if it doesn't matter
> there are no values anyway)) says the believing and acting like you
> have free will is the way that has the most expected return.

Pascal, I think it was, advanced essentially the same argument in
order to defend the proposition that one should believe in god.

However, both sides of the argument agree that the issue at hand
has no satisfactory resolution, and thus we are free to be
religious about it; both are also forgetting that the answer to
this question has practical consequences.

Pick your favorite definition of free will. Unless it is one
where the "free will" has no causal relationship with the rest
of the world (but then why does it matter?), the existence or
lack of existence of free will will have measurable consequences.

For example, my own definition of free will has consequences
that, among many other things, includes the proposition that,
under normal circumstances, an initiation of physical force is
harmful both to the agent and the patient. (Do not argue this
proposition in this newsgroup, PLEASE.) It also entails a
definition of the debatable terms like `normal' and `harm' by
means of which this statement can be interpreted. This means
that I can test the validity of my definition of free will by
normal scientific means and thus takes the problem of free will
out of the religious and into the practical.

------------------------------

Date: 11 Jul 88 01:47:57 GMT
From: pasteur!agate!gsmith%garnet.berkeley.edu@ames.arpa  (Gene W.
      Smith)
Subject: Re: How to dispose of the free will issue (long)

In article <445@proxftl.UUCP>, bill@proxftl (T. William Wells) writes:

>Pick your favorite definition of free will. Unless it is one
>where the "free will" has no causal relationship with the rest
>of the world (but then why does it matter?), the existence or
>lack of existence of free will will have measurable consequences.

  Having a causal connection to the rest of the world is not the
same as having measurable consequences, so this argument won't
work. One possible definition of free will (with problems, but
don't let that worry us) is that there is no function (from
possible internal+external states to behavior, say) which
determines what the free will agent will do. To to test this is
to test a negative statement about the lack of a function, which
seems hard to do, to say the least.

>For example, my own definition of free will has consequences
>that, among many other things, includes the proposition that,
>under normal circumstances, an initiation of physical force is
>harmful both to the agent and the patient. (Do not argue this
>proposition in this newsgroup, PLEASE.) It also entails a
>definition of the debatable terms like `normal' and `harm' by
>means of which this statement can be interpreted. This means
>that I can test the validity of my definition of free will by
>normal scientific means and thus takes the problem of free will
>out of the religious and into the practical.

  This is such a weak verification of your free will hypothesis
as to be nearly useless, even if I accept that you are able to
make the deduction you claim. Freud claimed that psychoanalysis
was a science, deducing all kinds of things from his egos and his
ids. But he failed to show his explanations were to be preferred
to the possible alternatives; in other words, to show his ideas
had any real explanatory power. You would need to show your
ideas, whatever they are, had genuine explanatory power to claim
you had a worthwhile scientific theory.
--
ucbvax!garnet!gsmith    Gene Ward Smith/Garnet Gang/Berkeley CA 94720
"Some people, like Chuq and Matt Wiener, naturally arouse suspicion by
behaving in an obnoxious fashion." -- Timothy Maroney, aka Mr. Mellow

------------------------------

Date: 11 Jul 88 19:08:42 GMT
From: ns!ddb@umn-cs.arpa  (David Dyer-Bennet)
Subject: Re: How to dispose of the free will issue (long)

In article <488@aiva.ed.ac.uk>, jeff@aiva.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
> In article <794@l.cc.purdue.edu> cik@l.cc.purdue.edu (Herman Rubin) writes:
> >Whether or not we have free will, we should behave as if we do,
> >because if we don't, it doesn't matter.
> If that is true -- if it doesn't matter -- then we will do just as well
> to behave as if we do not have free will.
  While I would prefer to avoid *ALL* errors, I'll settle for avoiding
all *AVOIDABLE* erors.  If I do not have free will, none of my errors
are avoidable (I had no choice, right?); so I may as well remove the entire
no-free-will arena from my realm of consideration.
  The whole concept of "choosing to believe we have no free will" is
obviously bogus -- if we're choosing, then by definition we DO have free will.
  I understand, of course, that you all my be pre-destined not to comprehend
my arguments :-)
--
        -- David Dyer-Bennet
        ...!{rutgers!dayton | amdahl!ems | uunet!rosevax}!umn-cs!ns!ddb
        ddb@viper.Lynx.MN.Org, ...{amdahl,hpda}!bungia!viper!ddb
        Fidonet 1:282/341.0, (612) 721-8967 hst/2400/1200/300

------------------------------

Date: 11 Jul 88 19:16:19 GMT
From: ns!ddb@umn-cs.arpa  (David Dyer-Bennet)
Subject: Re: How to dispose of the free will issue (long)

In article <445@proxftl.UUCP>, bill@proxftl.UUCP (T. William Wells) writes:
> For example, my own definition of free will has consequences
> that,.... This means
> that I can test the validity of my definition of free will by
> normal scientific means and thus takes the problem of free will
> out of the religious and into the practical.
  Yep, that's what you'd need to have to take the debate out of the
religious and into the practical.  Not meaning to sound sarcastic, but
this is a monumental philosophical breathrough.  But could you exhibit
some of the difficult pieces of this theory; in particular, what is
the measurable difference between an action taken freely, and one that
was pre-determined by other forces?
--
        -- David Dyer-Bennet
        ...!{rutgers!dayton | amdahl!ems | uunet!rosevax}!umn-cs!ns!ddb
        ddb@viper.Lynx.MN.Org, ...{amdahl,hpda}!bungia!viper!ddb
        Fidonet 1:282/341.0, (612) 721-8967 hst/2400/1200/300

------------------------------

Date: 11 Jul 88 20:13:04 GMT
From: ns!logajan@umn-cs.arpa  (John Logajan x3118)
Subject: Re: How to dispose of the free will issue (long)


The no-free-will theory is untestable.
The free-will theory is like-wise untestable.
When the no-free-will theorists are not thinking about their lack of free will
they invariably adopt free-will outlooks.
So go with the flow, why fight your natural instincts to believe in that which
is un-provable.  If you must choose between un-provable beliefs, take the one
that requires the least effort.

- John M. Logajan @ Network Systems; 7600 Boone Ave; Brooklyn Park, MN 55428 -
- ...amdahl!bungia!ns!logajan, {...uunet, ...rutgers} !umn-cs!ns!logajan     -

------------------------------

Date: 11 Jul 88 22:27:53 GMT
From: uhccux!lee@humu.nosc.mil  (Greg Lee)
Subject: Re: How to dispose of the free will issue (long)

>From article <11906@agate.BERKELEY.EDU>, by Gene W. Smith:
" ids. But he failed to show his explanations were to be preferred
" to the possible alternatives; in other words, to show his ideas
" had any real explanatory power. You would need to show your
" ideas, whatever they are, had genuine explanatory power to claim
" you had a worthwhile scientific theory.

No one ever knows the possible alternatives, therefore no scientific
theory is worthwhile.
        Greg, lee@uhccux.uhcc.hawaii.edu

------------------------------

End of AIList Digest
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