Date: Sun 8 May 1988 23:55-PDT From: AIList Moderator Kenneth Laws Reply-To: AIList@KL.SRI.COM Us-Mail: SRI Int., 333 Ravenswood Ave., Menlo Park, CA 94025 Phone: (415) 859-6467 Subject: AIList V6 #93 - Philosophy, Free Will To: AIList@KL.SRI.COM Status: RO AIList Digest Monday, 9 May 1988 Volume 6 : Issue 93 Today's Topics: Philosophy - Free Will ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: 2 May 88 10:42:23 GMT From: mcvax!ukc!strath-cs!glasgow!gilbert@uunet.uu.net (Gilbert Cockton) Subject: Sorry, no philosphy allowed here. > Could the philosophical discussion be moved to "talk.philosophy"? (John Nagle) I am always suspicious of any academic activity which has to request that it becomes a philosophical no-go area. I know of no other area of activity which is so dependent on such a wide range of unwarranted assumptions. Perhaps this has something to do with the axiomatic preferences of its founders, who came from mathematical traditions where you could believe anything as long as it was logically consistent. Before the 5th Generation scare, AI in the UK had been sat on for dodging too many methodological issues. Whilst, like the AI pioneers, they "could see no reasons WHY NOT [add list of major controversial positions", Lighthill could see no reasons WHY in their work. > What about compatibilism? There are a lot of arguments that free will is > compatible with strong determinism. (The ones I've seen are riddled with > logical errors, but most philosophical arguments I've seen are.) (R. O'Keefe) I would not deny the plausibility of this approach. However, detection of logical errors in an argument is not enough to sensibly dismiss it, otherwise we would have to become resigned to widespread ignorance. My concern over AI is, like some psychology, it has no integration with social theories, especially those which see 'reality' as a negotiated outcome of social processes, and not logically consistent rules. If the latter approach to 'reality', 'truth' etc. were feasible, why have we needed judges to deliver equity? For some AI enthusiasts, the answer of course, is that we don't. In the brave new world, machines will interpret the law unequivocably, making the world a much fairer place:-) Anyway, everyone know's that mathematicians are much smarter than lawyers and can catch up with them in a few months. Hey presto, rule-base! > One of the problems with the English Language is that most of the > words are already taken. ( --Barry Kort) ALL the words that exist are taken! And if the West Coast had managed to take more of them, we wouldn't have needed that silly Beach Boys talk ('far out' -> 'how extraordinary/well, fancy that; etc. :-)) AI was a natural term in the late 50's before the whole concept of definable and measurable intelligence was shot through in the 1960s on statistical, methodological and sociological grounds. Given the changed intellectual climate, it would be sensible if the mathematical naievety of the late 1950s were replaced by the more sophisticated positions of at least the 1970s. There's no need to change names, just absorb AI into computer science, linguistics, psychology, management etc. That would leave workers in advanced computer applications free to get on with pragmatic issues with no pressure to address the pottier postures of 'pure' AI. > I would like to learn how to imbue silicon with consciousness, > awareness, free will, and a value system. (--Barry Kort) But why! Surely you can't have been bullied that much at school to have developed such a materialist view of human nature? :-) :-) > Suppose I were able to inculcate a Value System into silicon. And in the > event of a tie among competing choices, I use a random mechanism to force > a decision. Would the behavior of my system be very much different from a > sentient being with free will? (--Barry Kort) Oh brave Science! One minute it's Mind on silicon, the next it's a little randomness to explain the inexplicable. Random what? Which domain? Does it close? Is it enumerable? Will it type out Shakespeare? More seriously 'forcing decisions' is a feature of Western capitalist society (a historical point please, not a political one). There are consensus-based (small) cultures where decisions are never forced and the 'must do something now' phenomena is mercifully rare. Your system should prevaricate, stall, duck the issue, deny there's a problem, pray, write to an agony aunt, ask its mum, wait a while, get its friends to ring it up and ask it out ... Before you put your value system on Silicon, put it on paper. That's hard enough, so why should a dumb bit of constrained plastic and metal promise any advance over the frail technology of paper? If you can't write it down, you cannot possibly program it. So come on you AI types, le't see your *DECLARATIVE TESTIMONIALS* on this news group by the end of the month. Lay out your value systems in good technical English. If you can't manage it, or even a little of it, should you really keep believing that it will fit onto silicon? ------------------------------ Date: 4 May 88 21:10:50 GMT From: dvm@yale-bulldog.arpa (Drew Mcdermott) Subject: Free Will My contribution to the free-will discussion: Suppose we have a robot that models the world temporally, and uses its model to predict what will happen (and possibly for other purposes). It uses Qualitative Physics or circumscription, or, most likely, various undiscovered methods, to generate predictions. Now suppose it is in a situation that includes various objects, including an object it calls R, which it knows denotes itself. For concreteness, assume it believes a situation to obtain in which R is standing next to B, a bomb with a lit fuse. It runs its causal model, and predicts that B will explode, and destroy R. Well, actually it should not make this prediction, because R will be destroyed only if it doesn't roll away quickly. So, what will R do? The robot could apply various devices for making causal prediction, but they will all come up against the fact that some of the causal antecedents of R's behavior *are situated in the very causal analysis box* that is trying to analyze them. The robot might believe that R is a robot, and hence that a good way to predict R's behavior is to simulate it on a faster CPU, but this strategy will be in vain, because this particular robot is itself. No matter how fast it simulates R, at some point it will reach the point where R looks for a faster CPU, and it won't be able to do that simulation fast enough. Or it might try inspecting R's listing, but eventually it will come to the part of the listing that says "inspect R's listing." The strongest conclusion it can reach is that "If R doesn't roll away, it will be destroyed; if it does roll away, it won't be." And then of course this conclusion causes R to roll away. Hence any system that is sophisticated enough to model situations that its own physical realization takes part in must flag the symbol describing that realization as a singularity with respect to causality. There is simply no point in trying to think about that part of the universe using causal models. The part so infected actually has fuzzy boundaries. If R is standing next to a precious art object, the art object's motion is also subject to the singularity (since R might decided to pick it up before fleeing). For that matter, B might be involved (R could throw it), or it might not be, if the reasoner can convince itself that attempts to move B would not work. But all this is a digression. The basic point is that robots with this kind of structure simply can't help but think of themselves as immune from causality in this sense. I don't mean that they must understand this argument, but that evolution must make sure that their causal-modeling system include the "exempt" flag on the symbols denoting themselves. Even after a reasoner has become sophisticated about physical causality, his model of situations involving himself continue to have this feature. That's why the idea of free will is so compelling. It has nothing to do with the sort of defense mechanism that Minsky has proposed. I would rather not phrase the conclusion as "People don't really have free will," but rather as "Free will has turned out to be possession of this kind of causal modeler." So people and some mammals really do have free will. It's just not as mysterious as one might think. -- Drew McDermott ------------------------------ Date: 6 May 88 12:23:46 GMT From: sunybcs!rapaport@boulder.colorado.edu (William J. Rapaport) Subject: Free Will and Self-Reference In article <28437@yale-celray.yale.UUCP> dvm@yale.UUCP (Drew Mcdermott) writes: > >Suppose we have a robot that models the world temporally, and uses >its model to predict what will happen... Now suppose it is in a >situation that includes various objects, including an object it calls R, >which it knows denotes itself. >The robot could apply various devices for making causal prediction, but they >will all come up against the fact that some of the causal antecedents of R's >behavior *are situated in the very causal analysis box* that is trying to >analyze them. The robot might believe that R is a robot, and hence that >a good way to predict R's behavior is to simulate it on a faster CPU, but >this strategy will be in vain, because this particular robot is itself. >... >Hence any system that is sophisticated enough to model situations that its own >physical realization takes part in must flag the symbol describing that >realization as a singularity with respect to causality. Followers of this debate should, at this point, familiarize themselves with the literature on "essential indexicals" and "quasi-indexicality", philosophical analyses designed for precisely such issues about self-reference. Here are some pertinent references, each with pointers to the literature: Castaneda, Hector-Neri (1966), " `He': A Study in the Logic of Self-Consciousness," Ratio 8: 130-157. Castaneda, Hector-Neri (1967), "On the Logic of Self-Knowledge," Nous 1: 9-21. Castaneda, Hector-Neri (1967), "Indicators and Quasi-Indicators," American Philosophical Quarterly 4: 85-100. Castaneda, Hector-Neri (1968), "On the Logic of Attributions of Self-Knowledge to Others," Journal of Philosophy 64: 439-456. Perry, John (1979), "The Problem of the Essential Indexical," Nous 13: 3-21. Rapaport, William J. (1986), "Logical Foundations for Belief Representation," Cognitive Science 10: 371-422. William J. Rapaport Assistant Professor Dept. of Computer Science||internet: rapaport@cs.buffalo.edu SUNY Buffalo ||bitnet: rapaport@sunybcs.bitnet Buffalo, NY 14260 ||uucp: {decvax,watmath,rutgers}!sunybcs!rapaport (716) 636-3193, 3180 || ------------------------------ Date: 3 May 88 15:36:40 GMT From: bwk@MITRE-BEDFORD.ARPA (Barry W. Kort) Subject: Re: Free Will & Self-Awareness I also went back to reread Professor Minsky's theory of Free Will in the concluding chapters of _Society of Mind_. I am impressed with the succinctness with which Minksky captures the essential idea that individual behavior is generated by a mix of causal elements (agency motivated by awareness of the state-of-affairs vis-a-vis one's value system) and chance (random selection among equal-valued alternatives). The only other treatises on Free Will that I resonated with were the ones by Raymond Smullyan ("Is God a Taoist" in _The Tao is Silent_ and reprinted in Hofstadter and Dennet's _The Mind's I_) and the book by Daniel Dennet (_Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting_). My own contribution to this discussion is summarized in the only free verse I ever composed in my otherwise prosaic career: Free Will or Self Determination I was what I was. I am what I am. I will be what I will be. --Barry Kort ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 5 May 88 08:49 EDT From: GODDEN%gmr.com@RELAY.CS.NET Subject: Re: Free Will $0.02: "The Mysterious Stranger" by Mark Twain is a novella dealing with free will and determinism that the readers of this list may find interesting. ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 3 May 88 01:38 EST From: Jeffy Subject: Re: Proper subject matter of AILIST ______________________________________________________________________________ >Date: 28 Apr 88 15:42:18 GMT >From: glacier!jbn@labrea.stanford.edu (John B. Nagle) >If the combined list is to keep its present readership, which includes some >of the major names in AI (both Minsky and McCarthy read AILIST), the content >of this one must be improved a bit. - As to questions about what is the appropriate content of AIlist - Presumably it is coextensive with the field "AI" - which I would find difficult to put a lid on - if you could do it, I would be happy. I suggest, however, that you cannot, for all research field boundaries are, by their nature, arbitrary (or, if not arbitrary, then _always_ extremely fuzzy at the edges). Quality - I cannot speak for; however, if you suggest limiting the group of people who can make contributions to AIList to, perhaps, PHD's in computer science, or perhaps, the membership of AAAI.... Or perhaps, limiting the content to specific technical issues (as opposed to the "philosophical" debates about AI & Freewill and AI & Ethics, or AI & Mimicking "human" consciousness.... Well, there are several reasons why this is just plain bad (and you must understand that as I argue my position - I am a person who is profoundly interested in AI & Ethics, and in hearing what people currently working in "AI" think about ethics, as it relates to the work they are doing). Reason 1: What would be the point of making such regulations? Why not respond to it case by case? Since, as I note, there are fuzzy boundaries, why not allow the readership (ever heard of representative democracy?) be the ones who put the social pressure on the contributors to contribute what they want to hear about? Anti-your-argument 3: So, we don't want to lose our present readership.... (which includes Minsky & McCarthy) - and we should tailor the "quality" (please tell me what this is) and the "subject matter" of our submissions to "keep" our "major names"? Why? Because they give the list a "good atmosphere"? Because they can hear what "lesser figures" have to say and perhaps drop a few pearls of wisdom into our midst? Why? Reason 2: I don't know about you, but I have this bias against the sectarianism and ivory-towerism of the scientific community at large such that the common society is excluded from decisions that are being made about the direction of research etc.. that are going to have major effects in years to come. Often, there is an unspoken "we are better because we _really_ know what we're doing" attitude among the scientific community, and I would like you to tell me why your message isn't representative of it. Jeff Coggshall ------------------------------ Date: 3 May 88 19:05:06 GMT From: centro.soar.cs.cmu.edu!acha@PT.CS.CMU.EDU (Anurag Acharya) Subject: this is philosophy ??!!? In article <1069@crete.cs.glasgow.ac.uk> gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) writes: >I am always suspicious of any academic activity which has to request that it >becomes a philosophical no-go area. I know of no other area of activity which >is so dependent on such a wide range of unwarranted assumptions. Perhaps this >has something to do with the axiomatic preferences of its founders, who came >from mathematical traditions where you could believe anything as long as it >was logically consistent. Just when is an assumption warranted ? By your yardstick (it seems ), 'logically inconsistent' assumptions are more likely to be warranted than the logically consistent ones. Am I parsing you wrong or do you really claim that ?! >logical errors in an argument is not enough to sensibly dismiss it, otherwise >we would have to become resigned to widespread ignorance. Same problem again ( sigh ! ). Just how do you propose to argue with logically inconsistent arguments ? Come on Mr. Cockton, what gives ? > My concern over AI >is, like some psychology, it has no integration with social theories, especially >those which see 'reality' as a negotiated outcome of social processes, and not >logically consistent rules. You wish to assert that reality is a negotiated outcome of social processes ??? Imagine Mr. Cockton, you are standing on the 36th floor of a building and you and your mates decide that you are Superman and can jump out without getting hurt. By the 'negotiated outcome of social processes' claptrap, you really are Superman. Would you then jump out and have fun ? > Your system should prevaricate, stall, duck the >issue, deny there's a problem, pray, write to an agony aunt, ask its >mum, wait a while, get its friends to ring it up and ask it out ... Whatever does all that stuff have to do with intelligence per se ? Mr. Cockton, what constitutes a proof among you and your "philosopher/sociologist/.." colleagues ? Since logical consistency is taboo, logical errors are acceptable, reality and truth are functions of the current whim of the largest organized gang around ( oh! I am sorry, they are the 'negotiated ( who by ? ) outcomes of social processes ( what processes ? )') how do you guys conduct research ? Get together and vote on motions or what ? -- anurag -- Anurag Acharya Arpanet: acharya@centro.soar.cs.cmu.edu "There's no sense in being precise when you don't even know what you're talking about" -- John von Neumann ------------------------------ End of AIList Digest ********************