Subject: From: AIList Moderator Kenneth Laws <AIList-REQUEST@SRI-AI>

From: [email-masked]
Date: Tue, 2 Apr 85 04:06:30 est

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Subject: AIList Digest   V3 #43
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AIList Digest             Monday, 1 Apr 1985       Volume 3 : Issue 43

Today's Topics:
  Expert Systems - EURISKO & DENDRAL/META-DENDRAL & OPS5 for PCs,
  News - MCC's Bob Inman named to SWB's board of directors,
  Symbolic Math - Functionals,
  Meeting - NAIL Journal Club,
  Seminars - Plans and Situated Actions (UCB) &
    Models in Syllogistic Reasoning (CSLI) &
    Programming Descriptive Analogies by Example (MIT) &
    Functional Role Semantics (CSLI) &
    NL Understanding and Generation (CMU)

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Sat 30 Mar 85 18:18:45-PST
From: Lee Altenberg <[email-masked]>
Subject: EURISKO

Does anyone know who in the Stanford area is actively working with
EURISKO, if anyone, now that Doug Lenat is in Texas?

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 1 Apr 85 09:02:48 mst
From: [email-masked] (C.I. Browne)
Subject: DENDRAL/META-DENDRAL

Can anyone tell me where either source or object code for DENDRAL and
META-DENDRAL may be obtained? SUMEX advises that they no longer either
support or distribute the program, and refer me to Molecular Design
Limited. While that company markets several interesting programs,
neither DENDRAL nor META-DENDRAL is among them.

It would be a pity if such programs have disappeared from the scene and
become unavailable to sites wishing to include them in an AI library.

Thank you.

cib

------------------------------

Date: 30 March 1985 1049-EST
From: Peter Pirolli@CMU-CS-A
Subject: OPS5 for PCs

I just received a flyer for a language called TOPSI which is supposed
to be an OPS5 clone developed for CP/M and MS-DOS machines.  Here are some
quotes from the flyer:

 "TOPSI has the full power of the original language PLUS extensions to
  improve its computational and list management capabilities.  Usage of
  memory and computer time is optimized for use on home computers."

 "TOPSI rule are written in a simple, legible form and compiled into a
  memory-efficient data structure enabling fast execution."

 "TOPSI's rule base and data base can be saved separately allowing a system
  to be exercised easilty with different data sets."

 "TOPSI is available on 5 1/4 in diskettes for 65k CP/M systems or MS-DOS
  with at least 128k of memory.  It comes complete with a users manual,
  example programs, a tutorial section on writing your own production systems,
  and a 30 day warranty."

The company is:
  Dynamic Master Systems Inc.
  P.O. Box 566456
  Atlanta, GA 30356
  [404] 565-0771

------------------------------

Date: Sat 30 Mar 85 15:21:43-CST
From: Werner Uhrig  <[email-masked]>
Subject: MCC's Bob Inman named to SWB's board of directors

[ from the Austin American Statesman - March 30, 1985 ]

Bob Inman, chairman and chief executive officer of MCC has been elected to the
board of directors of Southwestern Bell Corp.

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 20 Mar 85 09:48:24 PST
From: "David G. Cantor" <[email-masked]>
Subject: If f(f(x)) = x^2 - 2, what is f(x)?

          [Forwarded from the Prolog Digest by Laws@SRI-AI.]

Q: "Can a computer solve the query:

  "If f(f(x)) = x^2 - 2, what is f(x)?

If so, how?"

   [This question was forwarded to the Prolog Digest
   a few weeks ago by Nils Nilsson.  -- KIL]

The solution is essentially contained in the
article by Michael Restivo in the March 20
issue of Prolog Digest.

The nth Tchebycheff Polynomial may be defined
as
                         n        n
        T   (x)   =    u    +   v   ,
          n

where  u  =  (x + d)/2,  v   =  (x - d)/2, with
       d  =  sqrt(x * x - 4).

It is easy to check that, when n is an integer,
the powers of d cancel and hence that the above
functions are really are polynomials.  These
polynomials satisify numerous identities.  The
pertinent one here is that

        T   (T  (x))   =   T      (x) .
          m    n             m * n

This can be verified by elementary algebra (note
that u * v = 1).  It holds certainly for all complex
numbers m and n, subject to choosing appropriate
branches of the mth and nth power as well as the
square root, in the complex plane.

The function

        f(x)   =   T        (x)
                     sqrt(2)
then satisfies

        f(f(x)) =  T         (T         (x))
                     sqrt(2)    sqrt(2)

                =  T                   (x)
                     sqrt(2) * sqrt(2)

                =  T   (x)
                     2

                =   x * x   -   2,

and hence solves the original problem.

As to how a computer could solve this:

It need only search the mathematical literature
to find a paper by Michael Fried giving all
solutions to the functional equation (due to
Issai Schur):

F   (F   (x))   =   F        (x) .
  m    n              m * n

Fried shows that, under very general conditions,
the solutions are either
               n
F   (x)  =   x       or      F   (x)   =   T   (x) ,
  n                            n             n

as given above. The computer then need only recognize
that the given function

f(x)   =   T   (x) .
             2

Alternatively it could recognize the latter first,
and be led to study identities of the Tchebycheff
polynomials.

-- David G. Cantor

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 29 Mar 85 12:13:39 pst
From: Jeff Ullman <ullman@diablo>
Subject: NAIL! (Not another implementation of Logic!) Journal Club

         [Forwarded from the Stanford BBoard by Laws@SRI-AI.]

There is a meeting of people interested in implementation
of database systems with a "knowledge" component, i.e., a logical
language providing access to a database.
We primarily read and present papers, and present our own ideas
on the subject.

The first Spring meeting is 1PM Weds. 4/3, in 252MJH, and
subsequent meetings are Wednesdays, 11AM in 301MJH.

You can get on the nail list by mailing to mailer@diablo
a message with *subject heading* add <yourname> to nail

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 28 Mar 85 14:45:45 pst
From: chertok%ucbcogsci@Berkeley (Paula Chertok)
Subject: Seminar - Plans and Situated Actions (UCB)

                          BERKELEY COGNITIVE SCIENCE PROGRAM
                         Cognitive Science Seminar -- IDS 237B

                 TIME:                Tuesday, April 2, 11 - 12:30
                 PLACE:               240 Bechtel Engineering Center
                 (followed by)
                 DISCUSSION:          12:30 - 1:30 in 200 Building T-4

            SPEAKER:        Lucy Suchman, Intelligent  Systems  Laboratory,
                            Xerox PARC

            TITLE:          ``Plans and Situated Actions:  the  problem  of
                            human-machine communication''

                 Researchers in Cognitive Science view the organization and
            significance  of action as derived from plans, which are prere-
            quisite to and prescribe action at whatever level of detail one
            might imagine.  Mutual intelligibility on this view is a matter
            of the recognizability of plans, due to common conventions  for
            the  expression  of  intent, and common knowledge about typical
            situations and appropriate actions.  An alternative view, drawn
            from  recent  work  in  social science, treats plans as derived
            from situated  actions.   Situated  actions  as  such  comprise
            necessarily  ad  hoc  responses to the actions of others and to
            the contingencies of particular situations.  Rather than depend
            upon the reliable recognition of intent, successful interaction
            consists in the  collaborative  production  of  intelligibility
            through  mutual  access to situation resources, and through the
            detection, repair or exploitation of differences in understand-
            ing.

                 As common sense formulations designed  to  accomodate  the
            unforseeable   contingencies  of  situated  action,  plans  are
            inherently vague.  Researchers interested in  machine  intelli-
            gence  attempt  to  remedy the vagueness of plans, to make them
            the  basis  for  artifacts  intended  to   embody   intelligent
            behavior,  including  the  ability to interact with their human
            users.  I  examine the  problem  of  human-machine  interaction
            through  a case study of people using a machine designed on the
            planning model, and intended to be intelligent and interactive.
            A conversation analysis of "interactions" between users and the
            machine reveals that the machine's insensitivity to  particular
            circumstances  is  both a central design resource, and a funda-
            mental limitation.   I  conclude  that  problems  in  Cognitive
            Science's  theorizing  about  purposeful  action as a basis for
            machine intelligence are due to  the  project  of  substituting
            plans  for  actions,  and  representations  of the situation of
            action for action's actual circumstances.

------------------------------

Date: Wed 27 Mar 85 17:18:44-PST
From: Emma Pease <[email-masked]>
Subject: Seminar - Models in Syllogistic Reasoning (CSLI)

         [Excerpted from the CSLI newsletter by Laws@SRI-AI.]

           CSLI ACTIVITIES FOR *NEXT* THURSDAY, April 4, 1985

   2:15 p.m.            CSLI Seminar
     Redwood Hall       ``Manipulating Models in Syllogistic Reasoning''
     Room G-19          Marilyn Ford, CSLI
                        Discussion leader to be announced

      Johnson-Laird has argued that reasoners do not use formed rules of
   inference in solving problems involving syllogistic reasoning, but
   rather that they come to a solution by manipulating mental models.  I
   will show that while this certainly appears to be true, a number of
   details of Johnson-Laird's theory appear to be incorrect.  An
   alternative theory will be presented.                --Marilyn Ford

------------------------------

Date: 28 Mar 1985  12:06 EST (Thu)
From: "Daniel S. Weld" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Seminar - Programming Descriptive Analogies by Example (MIT)

              [Forwarded from the MIT bboard by SASW@MIT-MC.]

                            AI REVOLVING SEMINAR

                Programming Descriptive Analogies By Example

                               Henry Lieberman

Before making programs that can perform analogies by themselves, we can
attack the more modest goal of being able to communicate to the computer an
analogy which is already understood by a person.  I will describe a system
for "programming by analogy", called Likewise.  This new approach to
interactive knowledge acquisition works by presenting specific examples and
pointing out what aspects of the examples illustrate the more general case.
The system constructs a general rule which abstracts out the important
aspects so the rule can be applied to "analogous" examples.  Given a new
example, the system can then construct an analogy with the old example by
trying to instantiate analogous descriptions which correspond to the
descriptions constructed for the first example.  If a new example doesn't fit
an old concept exactly, a concept can be generalized or specialized
incrementally to make the analogy go through.  The operation of the analogy
system on a typical concept learning task is presented in detail.

Tuesday April 2, 1985   4:00pm      8th floor playroom

------------------------------

Date: Wed 27 Mar 85 17:18:44-PST
From: Emma Pease <[email-masked]>
Subject: Seminar - Functional Role Semantics (CSLI)

         [Excerpted from the CSLI newsletter by Laws@SRI-AI.]

           CSLI ACTIVITIES FOR *NEXT* THURSDAY, April 4, 1985

   4:15 p.m.            CSLI Colloquium
     Redwood Hall       ``Two Cheers for Functional Role Semantics''
     Room G-19          Ned Block, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

      There are two quite different frameworks for semantics:
   REDUCTIONIST approaches attempt to characterize the semantic in
   non-semantic terms.  NON-REDUCTIONIST approaches are more concerned
   with relations among meaningS than with the nature of meaning itself.
   The non-reductionist approaches are the more familiar ones (eg.,
   Montague, the model-theoretic aspect of situation semantics,
   Davidson, Katz).  The reductionist approaches come in 4 major
   categories:
      1. Theories that reduce meaning to the mental. (This is what is
   common to Grice and Searle.)
      2. Causal semantics--theories that see semantic values as derived
   from causal chains leading from the world to our words.
      3. Indicator semantics--theories that see natural and non-natural
   meaning as importantly similar.  The paradigm of meaning is the way
   the rings on the tree stump represent the age of the tree when cut
   down.  (Dretske/Stampe, and, in my view, though not in Barwise and
   Perry's, Situations and Attitudes)
      4. Functional role semantics--theories that see meaning in terms of
   the functional role of linguistic expressions in thought, reasoning,
   and planning, and in general in the way they mediate between sensory
   inputs and behavioral outputs.
      After sketching the difference between the reductionist and non-
   reductionist approaches, I will focus on functional role semantics, a
   view that has independently arisen in philosophy (where its sources
   are Wittgenstein's idea of meaning as use, and pragmatism) and
   cognitive science (where it is known as procedural semantics).
      I will concentrate on what theories in this framework can DO, e.g.,
   illuminate acquisition of and knowledge of meaning, principles of
   charity, how meaning is relevant to explanation of behavior, the
   intrinsic/observer-relative distinction, the relation between meaning
   and the brain, and the relativity of meaning to representational
   system.  The point is to give a sense of the fertility and power of
   the view, and so to provide a rationale for working on solutions to
   its problems.  Finally, I will sketch some reasons to prefer
   functional role semantics to the other reductionist theories.
      A copy of a paper which the talk draws on will be in the Ventura
   reading room.                                        --Ned Block

------------------------------

Date: 29 March 1985 1352-EST
From: Theona Stefanis@CMU-CS-A
Subject: Seminar - NL Understanding and Generation (CMU)

           [Forwarded from the CMU bboard by Laws@SRI-AI.]

                                Name:  NL Seminar
                                Date:  3 April
                                Time:  11:00-12:00
                                Place: WeH 7220

The Janus System: Coordinating Understanding and Generation
        Norman K. Sondheimer
        USC/Information Science Institute

Technology for natural language understanding and generation differs
significantly.  In cases where they have both been employed in the same
system, the results have been an impression of a system that could not
understand what it could say.  As part of ARPA's Strategic Computing
Initiative, researchers at USC/Information Sciences Institute and Bolt
Beranek and Newman have begun the design of a system that may be able to avoid
these problem.  The system employs the ATN parsing, KL-ONE based semantic
interpretation, and the NIGEL systemic grammar generator.   Much of the
integration of understanding and generation will come from a large domain
knowledge base developed in the NIKL (New Implementation of KL-One) knowledge
representation language.

This talk will be a short, informal look at the goals of the effort
and the system's initial design.

------------------------------

End of AIList Digest
********************