Subject: AIList Digest V4 #66

From: vtcs1::in% ([email-masked])
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 86 06:43:33 est

AIList Digest            Monday, 31 Mar 1986       Volume 4 : Issue 66

Today's Topics:
  Queries - Eliza & BKG & Public Domain Software &
    Lisp Syntax & Basic ATN & Economics of Expert Systems,
  Discussion - IQ Tests for Computers & Computer Dialog

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Date: Thu 27 Mar 86 13:26:15-CST
From: [email-masked]
Subject: Eliza

Where could I run Eliza (Weizenbaum's program) or get a copy of the
source code? Send reply to [email-masked].
H.

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Date: Thu, 27 Mar 86 10:35:57 cst
From: Dan Nichols <[email-masked]>
Subject: BKG request

I am interested in obtaining a copy of Hans Berliner's
famous BKG program. Does anyone know of an implementation
in LISP or for UNIX?
I would also love to have a copy of the source for studying.

Can anyone help or can anyone tell me if Mr. Berliner is
on the net and how to reach him?

Please respond to me rather than flooding this list.

 *USNail*              *electronic*
Dan Nichols            USENET: {ctvax,im4u,texsun,rice}!ti-csl!dnichols
POB 226015 M/S 238     ARPA:  Dnichols%TI-CSL@CSNet-Relay
Texas Instruments Inc. CSNET: Dnichols@Ti-CSL
Dallas, Texas          VOICE: (214) 995-6090
75266                  COMPUSERVE: 72067,1465

He o shite shiri-tsubome!

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Date: Fri, 28 Mar 86  9:45:20 EST
From: John Shaver  STEEP-TMAC 879-7602 <jshaver@apg-3>
Subject: Public Domain Software

I recently found a public doman PROLOG at Simtel20 pd:<pc-
blue.vol157>.  Are the other such programs which could be used by
person s with access to and IBM PC or similar computers.

                        John

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Date: 28 Mar 86 10:29:00 EST
From: "CUGINI, JOHN" <[email-masked]>
Reply-to: "CUGINI, JOHN" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Lisp syntax for inference engines

OK, I have a dumb question for you Lisp wizards.  In any
fact-rule inferencing system, there must be a distinction
between constants and variables. In Prolog and OPS5 these are
clearly distinguished by syntax, a la:

         |  constant    variable

CProlog  |  red         Color       (capital letter on variable)
OPS5     |  red         <color>     (angle brackets on variable)

The Lisp analogs would appear to be:

Lisp     |  'red        color       (quote on constant)

Note, for instance that you can bind "color" to "'red", or
to another variable, like "hair-color", or leave it unbound,
just like a good ole variable in Prolog and OPS5.  Similarly,
'red has an unchanging, self-evident value, just like a
well-behaved constant.

But in the published algorithms, like in "Lisp" by Winston or
"AI Programming" by Charniak, it seems that some spelling
convention for symbols is dreamed up to distinguish the two, eg,
red (constant) and ?color (variable), and the quoted form is not
used at all.  Why not use the mechanism provided directly by the
language?  Is this just a matter of taste, that people like to
decorate the variable and not the constant?  Or is there some
deep-seated semantic/efficiency-type reason lurking here?

John Cugini <Cugini@NBS-VMS>
National Bureau of Standards

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Date: Sun 30 Mar 86 16:28:53-EST
From: John C. Akbari <[email-masked]>
Subject: basic atn

are there new, readable introductions to the theory (and implementation!) of
atns?  examples of code would be most helpful.  anyone researching (or just
hacking) with object-oriented approaches to parsing, PLEASE inform me of
your work (e.g., FLAVORS, LOOPS, NoteCards, etc.).  will summarize for
ai bb.

thanks.

john akbari
[email-masked]

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Date: Thu, 27 Mar 86 10:50:41 est
From: [email-masked] (Ross Gayler)
Subject: economics of expert systems - assistance please

I am currently working on a project which, amongst other things, requires me
to find out something about the economics of expert systems. The technology
of expert systems seems to be a classical case of a solution searching for
appropriate problems. I am quite happy to believe that expert systems can
be much more cost-effective than conventional systems for certain classes of
problems, but what are the characteristics of these problems?

Specifically, I would like to know how the implementation costs of expert
systems vary as a function of attributes of the problem (complexity, size,
uncertainty etc.), attributes of the implementors (experience with tools and
domain etc.) and the attributes of the tools (representations, inference
methods, strategies etc.). I would also like to know how the system costs
are distributed across the system life cycle and how all this information
compares with conventional computer systems.

If this was a movie it would be "Yourdon and de Marco do expert systems".

I can't recall having seen any serious discussion of this area. The only
statements have been along the lines of "We coded 10 rules per week" and
unsubstantiated claims for ease of maintenance. I don't actually expect
strong empirical work at this stage but some good conceptual analyses would
be nice. Any references, pointers or opinions would be gratefully accepted.

Ross Gayler                     | ACSnet:       [email-masked]
Division of Research & Planning | ARPA:         [email-masked]
Queensland Department of Health | CSNET:        [email-masked]
GPO Box 48                      | JANET:        psych.uq.oz!ross@ukc
Brisbane        4001            | UUCP:      ..!seismo!munnari!psych.uq.oz!ross
AUSTRALIA                       | Phone:        +61 7 227 7060

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Date: Fri, 21 Mar 86 09:57:28 cst
From: preece%ccvaxa@gswd-vms (Scott E. Preece)
Subject: More on IQ tests for Computers.

        Two gripes with this. Who are the carbon/tissue *computers* he is
        talking about?  Secondly, computers will  never be "intelligent";
        however software might *appear* intelligent in certain respects.
        Nuff said.
        Gordon Joly

Do we really want this list to be a battleground for unsubstantiated
personal opinions on the potential for machine intelligence?

scott preece
gould/csd - urbana
uucp:   ihnp4!uiucdcs!ccvaxa!preece
arpa:   preece@gswd-vms

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Date: 25 Mar 86 03:14:07 GMT
From: [email-masked]  (Mark Davis)
Subject: Computer Dialogue

I have a question that I have been pondering over for some time.
I have asked a few people about it and have received a few
different answers. The question is:
  Can a Computer feel, and tell you it's feelings?

I say that if the computer is actually having a bad day (ie. disk
troubles and the like ) that somewhere in the operating system
there should exist some functions to let the user know how it
feels in some friendly way.
I consider this to be a true feeling of the computer.
However many of my associates tell me that this would
be something that is built into the system of an un-living thing,
And that this is only simulated.

I would like to hear your opinions on this subject.

               Mark Davis

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Date: 24 Mar 86 13:59:30 GMT
From: allegra!mit-eddie!think!harvard!talcott!panda!teddy!mjn@ucbvax.
      berkeley.edu
Subject: Re: re: Computer Dialogue #1

> Maybe not, but this only applies to present-day computers.  "Some people
> realize that brain cells don't feel emotions any more than toasters do"...
> doesn't mean that a combination of many brain cells cannot, and the same
> could apply to future computers with many times the capability of today's
> computers.

"Some people realize that brain cells don't feel emotions any more than
toasters do"... doesn't mean that a combination of many toasters cannot, and
the same could apply to future toasters with many times the capability of
today's toasters.

                Mark J. Norton
                {decvax,linus,wjh12,mit-eddie,cbosgd,masscomp}!genrad!panda!mjn
                mjn@sunspot

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Date: 27 Mar 86 02:52:36 GMT
From: [email-masked] (B.KORT)
Subject: Re: Computer Dialogue

Mark Davis asks if computers have anything akin to human feelings.

One of the most salient of human feelings is pain, which is the
name of the brain state triggered by neural impulses signalling
damage or distress to body tissue.

Consider one of the most complex computers in operation today--a
No. 5 ESS (Electronic Switching System) in the North American
Telephone Network.  It has many sensors throughout its equipment
bays which detect loss of functionality.  These sensors raise
alarms in the central processor which are functionally equivalent
to the human sensation of pain.  The central processor responds
by taking steps to ameliorate the problem.  It calls the "doctor"
(craftsperson) for assistance and otherwise takes prudent steps
to protect itself from consequential harm.

On another level of analogy, there is an interesting comparison
between diagnostic messages from a computer and human emotional
responses when faced with a situation ("input") for which
the computer or person is unprepared.  (See my Computer Dialogues
#1 and #2 for a somewhat whimsical portrayal of this comparison.)

Leaving aside the semantic issues, one notes a curious mapping
between machine states/brain states and the corresponding
input/output patterns.  It seems to me that human feelings
correspond *mutatis mutandis* to functionally equivalent
phenomena within computers and other complex systems.

--Barry Kort  ...ihnp4!hounx!kort

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Date: 23 Mar 86 15:03:20 GMT
From: [email-masked] (B.KORT)
Subject: Re: Computer Dialogue #1

Dear Charles and Peter,

Please understand that I wrote Computer Dialogues #1 and #2 as "flights
of fancy" to imagine some of the problems that might arise when
self-programming computers begin to interact with each other.  I gave
the computers some anthropomorphic emotions, thinly disguised as
diagnostic messages.  My goal was to bridge the gulf between those who
love machines and those who dread them.  [...]

For those who are interested in the deeper philosophical issues of the
soul, may I recommend the two short stories by Terrell Miedener in
The Mind's I.  One is the touching story of a chmimpanzee with an
enquiring mind entitled The Soul of Martha, a Beast.  The other is
about a mechanical mouse with a survival instinct entitled The Soul
of the Mark III Beast.

Regards,

Barry

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End of AIList Digest
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